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SEARCH INCIDENT TO A TRAFFIC ARREST: TH
ROBINSON-GUSTAFSON REASONABLE PER SE RULE
Thomas J. Elkins
Kirk A. Wheeler
Courts have long recognized that there exist certain exceptions to
the fourth amendment's requirement of a warrant as a precondition to
searches and seizures. One such exception has been the search of the
person incident to a lawful arrest. Although long recognized it had
not been fully articulated by the Supreme Court until the recent cases
of United States v. Robinson' and Gustafson v. Florida.2 In 6 to 3
decisions, the court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, laid down the
rule that once an arrest has been effectuated, a full search of the person
is always reasonable. These cases are of particular importance as they
involved traffic violations, an area in which state and lower federal
courts have been inclined heretofore to place limitations upon the right
of searches of the person incident to arrest.
The Robinson case involved the following facts: Defendant Rob-
inson had initially been stopped by one officer Jenks, four days prior
to his arrest, for a routine traffic check. At this time Jenks noticed
a discrepancy between the birthdates on defendant's operator's permit
and draft registration card. A subsequent investigation determined
that Robinson's license had been revoked and that he had obtained a
new one by reapplying using a different birthdate. Upon observing
Robinson driving an auto four days later, Jenks stopped defendant's car
and placed him under arrest for driving with a revoked operator's per-
mit.' Subsequent to the arrest, officer Jenks conducted a full field
search of Robinson. During the search, officer Jenks found a crumpled
cigarette package in Robinson's coat pocket. Although he did not con-
1. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
2. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
3. Under 40 D.C. § 302(d) (1968), this offense carries a mandatory minimumjail term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both.
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sider the package to contain a weapon, he nonetheless opened it and
discovered 14 gelatin capsules. Later analysis found the capsules to
contain heroin, upon which a conviction was obtained.4
On appeal before the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Robinson argued that the search conducted by the police officer
exceeded its permissible scope and intensity, such scope and intensity
being limited by the type of crime for which arrest was made and the
absence of evidence or fruits in a traffic offense. After remanding the
case for a further evidentiary hearing on the scope of the search,8 the
court of appeals reversed the holding of the District Court, stating that
searches in such cases should be limited to a pat down search for weap-
ons.
6
In the Gustafson case, the defendant was stopped for a routine
spot check after his car was seen weaving once or twice over the center-
line. When it was discovered that Gustafson did not have his operator's
permit on his person, the officer used his discretionary power and took
the defendant into custody.7 The officer then proceeded to conduct
a pat down search of Gustafson. He removed a cigarette box from
the defendant's coat pocket and opened it. Inside the box were found
marijuana cigarettes which led to his conviction. The District Court
of Appeals of Florida, Fourth Circuit, reversed Gustafson's conviction,
holding that the search conducted by the officer was unreasonable and
in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.8 The Supreme
Court of Florida reversed that decision, reinstating the conviction.0
The facts of these cases are typical of a myriad of state and lower
federal court cases decided in recent years. Both cases involved cus-
todial traffic arrests: in Robinson the custodial arrest was mandatory;
in Gustafson, more typical of the average traffic situation, the decision
to take the offender into custody was discretionary with the officer.
Many courts which have faced the issue of search incident to arrest in
traffic cases and other minor crimes have invalidated general searches
of the person. 10  The limitations placed on such searches vary from
4. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (repealed 1970); 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964) (re,-
pealed 1970).
5. United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.15 (1968).
8. Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
9. State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
10. See, e.g., Grundstrom v. Beto, 213 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967); People v.
1974]
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general rules prohibiting all searches incident to these offenses without
independent probable cause," to those permitting a search but limiting
it to a protective Terry-type "pat-down".'2
In reaching a conclusion opposite to these cases the Supreme
Court chose to ignore the plethora of modem case law in this area.
The majority opinion commenced by embarking upon an historical an-
alysis of the exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement
in the area of search incident to arrest. Although admitting that vir-
tually all of the statements of the Court "affirming the existence of
an unqualified authority -to search are dicta,"'13 Justice Relmquist con-
cluded that the line of cases subsequent to Weeks,' 4 taken with the
common law developments prior to that decision, imply an affirmative
authority to search. The majority then continued to remove impedi-
ments by placing a factual limitation on the Terry case by concluding
that arrest necessitates a different standard of search from a mere stop.
The majority's key holding was that:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful cus-
todial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to dis-
cover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later
decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person
of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on prob-
able cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to
the arrest requires no additional justification.' 5
From this rather broad holding, the Court has apparently estab-
lished completely modified general principles for searches incident to
arrest. First, the Court is taking a categorical approach to the reason-
ableness of a search incident to arrest. By the subtle shift in applica-
tion of the fourth amendment's reasonableness test to the arrest, rather
than the particular search conducted, the Court has moved away from
a case by case analysis of the scope of the individual search' G and has
Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451, 299 N.E.2d 653, 346 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1973); Barnes v. State,
25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
11. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969); State v. Curtis,
290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275
A.2d 51 (1971).
12. Cowdin v. People, 491 P.2d 569 (Colo. 1971); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d
116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
13. 414 U.S. at 230.
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. 414 U.S. at 235.
16. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Go-Bait Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
[Vol. 10:256
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instead expressed the need only to examine the reasonableness and/or
probable cause existing for the arrest. The arrest being valid, the
search is per se reasonable. The only limits placed upon the scope
of the search is that of the Rochin v. California case, 17 which is the
"patently abusive" search which is violative of an individual's due proc-
ess rights.
The Court also rejected the need for a subjective or objective fear
that the defendant may be armed for the search to be initiated.
Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the
authority to search, it is of no moment that (the officer) did
not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent, or that he
did not himself suspect that the respondent was armed.'
Once the search has been lawfully initiated the officer can seize any
fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband probative of criminal conduct.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell viewed the lawful custo-
dial arrest as a surrender of any expectation of privacy under the fourth
amendment: "If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by
the Fourth Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding
governmental concern."' 9
The minority opinion, written by Justice Marshall, placed great
emphasis on the necessity of a case by case approach, rather than a
categorical approach, to the question of reasonableness in searches.
The basic premise for this stance was the belief that some nexus must
exist between the need to make a search and the direction which the
individual intrusion takes. Thus the minority did not take issue with
the right to a limited frisk for the purpose of discovering weapons when
an officer makes an incustody arrest. However, Justice Marshall
stressed that a search which is Teasonable in its inception may violate
the fourth amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.
The dissent argued that since the underlying rationales for permitting
a Terry search and for permitting the search of a traffic violator are
identical-a search for weapons-the scope of the searches must be
the same. Because the officers in these cases exceeded that scope,
the evidence obtained should have been excluded as violative of the
fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness in the conduct of
searches.
17. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
18. 414 U.S. at 236.
19. 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
1974]
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Although the Supreme Court stated in Robinson that its decision
was grounded in the language of earlier Supreme Court cases and the
history of the right to search incident to arrest at common law, this con-
clusion does not seem fully justified by a thorough examination of the
existing case law.
One of the earliest proclamations of the right to search incident
to arrest by the Supreme Court was made in dictum in Weeks v. United
States:
What then is the present case? Before answering that in-
quiry specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion
to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right of
Government, always recognized under the English and
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime.
This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases.20
Eleven years later, Carroll v. United States' was decided. Al-
though the case involved a search which was not grounded on the doc-
trine of a search incident to arrest, the Court expressed in dicta logic
similar to that found in Weeks. In the same year, the case of Agnello
v. United States22 limited in time and place what was considered to be
a search incident to arrest. While holding that the search of the de-
fendant's home after his arrest at the home of a co-conspirator was not
incident to his arrest, the Court reaffirmed the dicta of Carroll and
Weeks:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and
to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find
and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as
the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons
and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to
be doubted.23
The cases since Agnello echo these justifications for a search inci-
dent to arrest.24 None of these cases can be cited for the proposition
that the fact of lawful arrest always establishes the authority to conduct
a full search. The constant emphasis has been on the existence of un-
derlying circumstances in the arrest situation which point to the justifi-
20. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
21. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
23. Id. at 30.
24. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
[Vol. 10:256260
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cations for the search; i.e. the likelihood of fruits, instrumentalities, or
evidence, as supplying reasonable grounds for the search incident to
arrest. Thus the language in Peters v. New York25 was a reaffirmation
of a long existing principle rather than a "novel and far reaching limita-
tion '' 26 or careless language as the majority in Robinson and Gustafson
attempted to characterize it. In the Peters case the Court stated:
. . .the incident search was obviously justified "by the need
to seize weapons and other things which might be used to
assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need
to prevent the destruction of evidence of ,the crime." Pres-
ton v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Moreover,
it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer
Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing
examination of Peters and his personal effects.27
Equally unsubstantiated is the Court's statement that the common
law history of England and the United States conclusively support the
categorical fact-of-arrest-reasonable-per se approach. Although a num-
ber of early state courts took this approach, it was never the law of
England, and some early state cases emphasized the need for limita-
tions on the search incident to arrest.2 s Of particular interest with re-
gard to this issue is the English case of Leigh v. Cole, where it was
said:
. . .With respect to searching a prisoner, there is no doubt
that a man when in custody may so conduct himself, by rea-
son of violence of language or conduct, that a police officer
may reasonably think it prudent and right to search him, in
order to ascertain whether he has any weapon with which he
might do mischief to the person or commit a breach of the
peace; but at the same time it is quite wrong to suppose that
any general rule can be applied to such a case. Even when
a man is confined for being drunk and disorderly, it is not
correct to say that he must submit to the degradation of being
searched, as the searching of such a person must depend
upon all the circumstances of the case.2 9
Further, the English cases which allow a search incident -to arrest
have been explicit in demonstrating the evidentiary purpose of the
25. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
26. 414 U.S. at 229.
27. 392 U.S. at 67.
28. For early cases holding that the fact of arrest always justifies a search, People
v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923); CloAson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482
(1867); for those suggesting limitations, cases cited at note 32 infra.
29. Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. L. Cas. 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853).
1974]
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search, based on the crime for which the person was arrested."s
Opinions emphasizing the necessity of an evidentiary purpose to
justify searches of the person incident to arrest are not lacking in
American case law either. 1 As in the English cases, there can be
found thought that the search need not only be properly incident to
a lawful arrest, but, additionally, must be reasonably calculated to
achieve legitimate ends. As stated in an early Florida case:
* . . [A] reasonable search and seizure that is properly in-
cident to a lawful arrest may be made in a reasonable and
proper manner by the officer making the lawful arrest; but
the search and seizure should not be inappropriate to the rea-
sonable requirements for making effective a lawful arrest.2
Thus the categorical approach taken 'by the Supreme Court does
not enjoy widespread support from an historical analysis. Those cases
which proposed limitations on such searches are more consonant with
other objectives repeatedly asserted by the Court, in particular the gen-
eral prohibition of exploratory searches,3 3 and the assertion made again
and again in this area of the law that reasonableness is to be decided
on a case by case basis. 4
Based on the assumption more reasonably drawn from these cases,
that the fundamental basis of the search-incident exception lies not in
the fact of arrest, but in the presence of underlying justifications for
the search, many state and lower federal courts have struck down
searches incident to traffic arrests, and in some cases for other minor
crimes as well, where these justifications were non-existent.38 The
30. This was clearly the case in Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox Crim. Cas.
245 (Exch. Ireland 1887), although the Court quotes it to support its fact-of-arrest
approach. See 10 HALsBURy, LAws OF ENGLAND 356 (3rd ed. Simonds 1955).
31. Holker v. Hennesey, 141 Mo. 527, 42 S.W. 1090 (1897).
32. Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 355, 91 So. 376, 378 (1921). See also Pickett v.
Marcucci's Liquors, 112 Conn. 169, 151 A. 526 (1930); State v. Merritt, 86 Fla. 164,
99 So. 230 (1923); Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 NJ.L. 621, 64 A. 121 (Court of Errors and
Appeals, 1906).
33. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
34. Cases cited note 16 supra.
35. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969); Amador-Gonzalez
v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912
(N.D. Tex. 1967); United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962); State v.
Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962); People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205 (1972); Cowdin v. People, 491 P.2d 569
(Colo. 1971); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833 (1960); People v. Mayo, 19 IIl. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960); State v. Curtis,
290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); State v. Schevchuk, 291 Minn. 365, 191
N.W.2d 557 (1971); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d
[Vol. 10:256
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reasoning of these cases is persuasive. Their basic premise is that all
searches must be reasonable. In the case of a search incident to a law-
ful arrest, this standard of reasonableness is not met by anything in-
herent in the right to take the offender into custody. 6  The search
must stand or fall in light of the particular circumstances surrounding
the arrest, and the nature of the crime for which the arrest was made.T
The arrest does not make the search reasonable; the probable existence
of a legitimate search-object does. Where the nature of the crime for
which the arrest was made would indicate that the suspect may be
armed or that he may have in his possession fruits, instrumentalities
or evidence of the crime, reasonable grounds are provided to conduct
a full search of the person.3 s
Additional circumstances may provide these reasonable grounds
where the nature of the crime, in and of itself, does not. What these
circumstances must consist of has been a point of disagreement among
the courts. Some courts have taken the position that these circum-
stances must amount to independent probable cause to conduct the
search. 9 From this point of view the ensuing search with probable
cause can hardly be termed incident to the arrest at all. More often
the cases say that the fact of arrest, coupled with "special circum-
stances" will provide reasonable grounds for the search; the nebulous
term "special circumstances' being something less than the probable
cause required to support a search not incident to an arrest.40  Thus,
in the Illinois case of People v. Watkins41 a search was allowed where
it was ". . . reasonable for the arresting officers to assume that they
were dealing with a situation more serious than a parking violation." 42
Some courts have gone beyond these cases, adopting the rationale
of the stop-and-frisk cases, allowing a pat-down weapons search in all
instances.43 While the nature of the crime or facts of the particular
789 (1967); Watt v. State, 487 P.2d 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Lawson v. State,
484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d
51 (1971); Commonwealth v. Dussell, 439 Pa. 392, 266 A.2d 659 (1970); Barnes v.
State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
36. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969).
37. Id.
38. Cases cited note 35 supra.
39. Cases cited note 11 supra.
40. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101 Cal. Rptr.
837, 496 P.2d 1205 (1972); Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
41. People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833
(1960).
42. Id. at 437.
43. C sm citgd nQte 12 supra,
1974]
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arrest may not point toward the probable existence of a specific search-
object, the history of assaults on police officers, coupled with the pro-
longed officer-arrestee contact which will be present in every custodial
arrest, justifies the limited intrusion of a pat-down search. As in the
stop-and-frisk cases, the reason for the pat-down is the protection of
the officer, but the important distinction in the arrest cases is that there
need be no apprehension that the person to be searched is armed."
While some search is allowed in all instances of custodial arrest, the
absence of a legitimate search-object because of the nature of the crime
provides a limitation on the intensity of the search.
In adopting the categorical fact-of-arrest approach the Supreme
Court avoided some of the larger issues particularly present in the traffic
arrest situation. The traffic arrest is a unique, if frequent, kind of con-
frontation between state and citizen. While opinions announcing limi-
tations on the right -to search incident to traffic arrests have made much
of the lack of logical connection between the arrest and the search, it
is apparent that these courts are relying on more practical policy factors
drawn from the peculiar status of the traffic offense, as compared with
other crimes.45 One might agree with Mr. Justice Powell that while
the "essential premise" of the fourth amendment is the protection of
the person's legitimate expection of privacy, in many cases we must
accept an abatement of these rights in the face of "legitimate and over-
riding governmental concern." 40  However, to abate a citizen's rights
in the face of an arrest for a serious misdemeanor or a felony is funda-
mentally different from a similar abatement based on a traffic arrest.
The traffic violation is a creature of modem society, growing out of myr-
iad rules and regulations with which, in astounding numbers, even the
most honest and innocent run afoul. It stands alone in its lack of crim-
inal culpability, not rising even to the status of most misdemeanors, with
which it is often classed. It is difficult to see what legitimate govern-
mental concern could override the individual's right of privacy in his
person and personal effects, where the object of taking the party into
custody is only that he should post security for a future appearance in
a traffic court.
A final point reached by at least two other courts,47 but not con-
44. Compare cases cited at note 12 supra with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
45. Cases cited note 35 supra.
46. Case cited note 19 supra.
47. Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Common-
wealth v. Freeman, 293 A.2d 84 (Pa. Super. 1972).
[Vol. 10:256
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sidered in these opinions of the Supreme Court, deals with the interre-
lationship between the degree of allowable search and the already ap-
parent problem of the pretext or search-motivated arrest. Although
not squarely before the Court in either Robinson or Gustafson, this pos-
sibility of abuse bears significantly on the problem. The categorical
"fact-of-arrest" approach will lend support to the use of such search-
motivated or bad faith arrests. This follows from the fact that the arrest
in these situations is almost always based on a traffic or a status crime,
and, in the search-motivated arrest, the allowing of a full search in all
instances makes the arrest more fruitful.
Faced with an obvious pretext situation Judge Wisdom, in Ama-
dor-Gonzales v. United States,"' argued for the logical nexus approach
in all cases, noting:
The significant element in this case is the danger that the
lowly offense of a traffic violation-of which all of us have
been guilty at one time or another-may be established as
the basis for searches circumventing the rights quaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. This danger exists in lawful traffic
arrests as well as in pretextual arrests.49
Demanding that there be a logical nexus between the crime for
which the arrest was made and the search removes much of the diffi-
culty in this area. The arrest will simply not support exploratory
search. It also alleviates the often times impossible burden of proving
that the arrest was motivated in bad faith. Moreover, where the cus-
todial arrest is discretionary such a limitation reduces the possibility of
searches based on the racial, socio-economic or age biases of the par-
ticular officer.
Thus, there is a great deal more to the issues of the right and the
scope and intensity of searches incident to arrests than whether one
position or the other is more readily supported by history and the intent
of the framers. From the point of view of the traffic arrest, it is a pecu-
liarly modem problem capable of fruitful analysis only after examina-
tion of current conditions in light of the basic principles inherent in the
fourth amendment. The denomination of a search as reasonable
merely because it is incident to an arrest does not, ipso facto, deny its
intrusive character. Where the specific intrusion cannot be justified
by the legitimate needs of government it is patently violative of the
fourth amendment's fundamental meaning. Particularly in the area of
48. 391 F.2d 308.
49. Id. at 318.
1974]
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traffic arrests, the categorical fact-of-arrest approach fails to meet these
standards.
Regardless of the particular limiting approach adopted, that limita-
tions should exist in such situations is much more consonant with the
general principles of the fourth amendment. The cases limiting the
right to search in some instances represent a ratification of the general
rule that in dealing with fourth amendment oases, the question of rea-
sonableness is to be decided on a case 'by case basis.50 They reaffirm
the long standing abhorrence of the general exploratory search"' and
the principle that a lawful intrusion provides no basis for a search of
greater intensity -than is warranted under the circumstances . 2
The failure of the Supreme Court in these two cases to adopt the
limited approach should neither defeat the logic of the previous state
cases contra, nor should it preclude further independent analysis of this
area of criminal procedure. The issues are too complex and the poten-
tial for abuse too great to apply the fact-of-arrest approach to arrests
for all crimes. Thus, this area presents an opportunity for the states
to exercise their right, often referred to by the Supreme Court, to de-
fine and develop their own standards consistent with the minimum re-
quirements set forth by the Supreme Court. 53
50. Cases cited note 16 supra.
51. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
[Vol. 10:256
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